31404

SoSe 22: Kleptocracy, Rents, and Development in Eurasia

Sebastian Hoppe

Information for students

Active participation requires the weekly submission of two questions and the preparation of a presentation of approximately 15 minutes.

Comments

Many states in Eurasia are characterised by authoritarian and kleptocratic structures. A large body of research argues that multi-level rent-seeking, a strategy of state, business and market capture aimed at gaining political, sometimes violent, access to and control over economic resources, prevents the emergence of broad growth-oriented coalitions and the implementation of developmental agendas in these societies. And yet, in the 20th and 21st centuries, some East and Southeast Asian countries have embarked on the path of substantial socioeconomic development despite similar hurdles. It is also evident that some post-Soviet societies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been able to create "pockets of efficiency", i.e. sectoral or even regional development successes, despite kleptocracy, corruption and rent-seeking, albeit with more moderate success than the Asian developmental states of the 20th century. A third group of Eurasian societies, on the other hand, seems unable to break the vicious cycle of authoritarianism, rent-seeking, and underdevelopment. The seminar explores this variety of rent-seeking and development in Eurasian societies, which offer a rich empirical ground to ask about the different sources of rents, the ways in which they are controlled and distributed by various actors, and the conditions under which rent-driven development processes succeed, falter or fail. To this end, we will first explore conceptual approaches to the relationship between kleptocracy, rent and development. We will then look at processes of rent management, rent channelling, and rent circulation, using different country cases, levels and sectors, to find out how various state and non-state actors seek to navigate, alter or block Eurasia’s political economies. close