10140308

WiSe 21/22: Informationsökonomie (V)

Jana Friedrichsen, Andreas Asseyer

Kommentar

Inhalte & Qualifikationsziele

The lecture introduces the theory of markets under incomplete information. In contrast to the standard model of the neoclassical equilibrium theory, we will analyze settings in which one side of the market is better informed than the other side. We study the theory in several different applications such as product markets under quality uncertainty, labor markets, insurance markets, and credit markets.

Content

Incomplete quality information
1. Equilibrium under adverse selection
2. Warranties
3. Moral hazard and reputation
Labor markets
1. Efficiency wages
2. Education as a signal
Insurance markets
1. Adverse selection
2. Moral hazard
Credit markets
1. Optimal contracts
2. Credit rationing
3. Collateral
Principal-agent model
1. Revelation principle
2. Moral hazard
Incomplete price information
1. Monopoly price paradox
2. Price dispersion
3. Price bargaining

Literature

Diamond, P. und M. Rothschild, Uncertainty in Economics: Readings and Exercises, New York (Academic Press) 1978
Hirshleifer J. und J. G. Riley The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1992
Phlips, L. The Economics of Imperfect Information, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1988
Rasmusen, E. Games and Information, Cambridge (Blackwell) 1995.
Bolton, P., and M. Dewatripont. Contract theory, Cambridge (MIT press) 2005.

Termine

Siehe Vorlesungsverzeichnis

Anrechenbarkeit

Zugangsvoraussetzungen & Vorkenntnisse

Anmeldung

CampusManagement

Prüfungsleistung

Klausur

Kurssprache

Englisch

Kontakt

Schließen

17 Termine

Regelmäßige Termine der Lehrveranstaltung

Fr, 12:00 - 14:00 9 Termine

Fr, 22.10.2021 12:00 - 14:00

Dozenten:
Prof. Dr. Jana Friedrichsen